Banks without Parachutes - Competitive Effects of Government Bail-out Policies by Hakenes, Hendrik & Schnabel, Isabel
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 · www.gesy.uni-mannheim.de 
Universität Mannheim · Freie Universität Berlin · Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin · Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München 
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn · Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung Mannheim 
 
Speaker: Prof. Konrad Stahl, Ph.D. · Department of Economics · University of Mannheim · D-68131 Mannheim, 
Phone: +49(0621)1812786 · Fax: +49(0621)1812785 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
June 2004 
 
 
 
 
*Hendrik Hakenes, MPI for Research on Collective Goods, Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10, 53113 Bonn, Germany, 
haakenes@mpp-rdg.mpg.de 
**Isabel Schnabel, MPI for Research on Collective Goods, Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10, D-53113 Bonn, Germany, 
schnabel@mpp-rdg.mpg.de  
 
 
 
Financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through SFB/TR 15 is gratefully acknowledged.
Discussion Paper No. 8 
Banks without Parachutes - 
Competitive Effects of Government 
Bail-out Policies 
Hendrik Hakenes* 
Isabel Schnabel**  
Banks without Parachutes —
Competitive Effects of
Government Bail-out Policies†
Hendrik Hakenes∗ and Isabel Schnabel∗∗
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn
Abstract: The explicit or implicit protection of banks through government bail-out
policies is a universal phenomenon. We analyze the competitive effects of such poli-
cies in two models with different degrees of transparency in the banking sector. Our
main result is that the bail-out policy unambiguously leads to higher risk-taking at
those banks that do not enjoy a bail-out guarantee. The reason is that the prospect
of a bail-out induces the protected bank to expand, thereby intensifying competition
in the deposit market and depressing other banks’ margins. In contrast, the effects
on the protected bank’s risk taking and on welfare depend on the transparency of
the banking sector.
Keywords: Government bail-out, banking competition, transparency, opacity, “too
big to fail”, financial stability.
JEL-Classification: G21, G28, L11.
First Version: November 12, 2003.
This Version: June 16, 2004.
†We thank Ju¨rgen Eichberger, Martin Hellwig and Dmitri Vinogradov and conference partic-
ipants at the “Workshop on Efficiency, Competition, and Regulation in Banking” in Sulzbach
as well as seminar participants at the University of Frankfurt and at the Max Planck Institute
for Research on Collective Goods for helpful comments and suggestions. Financial support from
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft is gratefully acknowledged.
∗Address: MPI for Research on Collective Goods, Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10, 53113 Bonn, Ger-
many, hakenes@mpp-rdg.mpg.de.
∗∗Address: MPI for Research on Collective Goods, Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10, 53113 Bonn, Ger-
many, schnabel@mpp-rdg.mpg.de
Banks without Parachutes – June 16, 2004 1
1 Introduction
In most countries, part of the banking sector is protected through implicit or explicit
government guarantees. These come in two forms: Public banks directly enjoy the
backing by the government, while very large banks are often subject to implicit
guarantees because they are “too big to fail”. Both the political and academic
discussion focus on the detrimental effects of such guarantees on the risk-taking
behavior of the protected banks. In contrast, the reactions of the remaining banks
in the banking system have not been dealt with in the literature. We close this gap
by analyzing the competitive effects of government bail-out policies on those banks
that do not enjoy a public guarantee. An understanding of other banks’ reaction is
crucial for the judgment of overall welfare effects of public bail-out policies.
The relevance of such competitive effects can be illustrated with an example from
Japan. Since the 1990s, Japanese private banks’ profitability has been compro-
mised by thin interest margins. These have been attributed to the competition from
government financial institutions as well as from (mostly large) banks receiving dis-
guised subsidies.1 In particular, private banks face strong competition from Japan’s
postal savings system, the biggest deposit taker in the world, which benefits from
an explicit government guarantee and tax exemptions and is subject to limited pru-
dential supervision. The extent of welfare losses arising from this type of “unfair
competition” (Fukao, p. 25, 2003b) depends essentially on how smaller private banks
adjust their risk-taking in reaction to shrinking profitability due to the subsidization
of public and larger banks.
The relationship between banks’ profit margins and their risk taking is one of the
central themes in the literature on competition and stability in the banking sector.
The basic idea is that competition tends to reduce the rents of banks, who react by
increasing their asset risk because of the well-known risk-shifting problem described
by Jensen and Meckling (1976). If one applies this idea to a setting with public
bail-out guarantees, one may conjecture that there will be a similar risk-shifting
problem at those banks that are not expected to be bailed out. In fact, this effect
will be the driving force in our model.
Our starting point is a model by Allen and Gale (2000, chapter 8.3) who analyze the
tradeoff between competition and stability in a static agency model.2 We extend
that model by introducing an asymmetric government bail-out policy where some
bank is bailed out with a higher probability than the others. Since there is no full
insurance of deposits as in Allen and Gale, depositors care about the risk of banks’
assets and demand default premia to be compensated for expected losses from bank
insolvencies. Like Allen and Gale, we model competition on the liabilities side of
1See Fukao (2003a,b) and Kashyap (2002) for an extensive overview of these problems. See also
the diagnosis in the Annual Report of the Bank for International Settlements (2002, pp. 133).
2See also Allen and Gale (2004).
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banks’ balance sheets in a Cournot fashion. We consider two time structures with
different patterns of information revelation: In the first model, banks are opaque in
the sense that depositors cannot observe risk before setting deposit rates. Hence,
default premia are set before deposit volumes and risk choices are determined.3
In the second model, we reverse the timing. Depositors can observe their bank’s
risk choice and the level of deposits before setting default premia. We call banks
transparent in this case.
Our main result is that the government bail-out policy unambiguously leads to
higher risk-taking at banks that do not enjoy a government guarantee. The reason
is that the subsidization induces the protected bank to expand its deposit volume,
no matter whether banks are opaque or transparent. Since deposit volumes are
strategic substitutes in our model, the other banks react by decreasing their deposit
volumes. However, the overall effect on aggregate deposits is positive such that there
is an increase in the deposit rate, depressing smaller banks’ margins and inducing
them to take higher risks.
Contrary to conventional wisdom, the effect of the guarantee on the protected bank
appears to be ambiguous. In the model with opaque banks, the protected bank
may have lower incentives to take risks, because the subsidy increases the bank’s
rents.4 With transparent banks, risk-taking unambiguously increases in the bail-
out probability, as suggested by public discussions of government bail-out policies.
Here, the argument is similar to the literature discussing excessive risk-taking in the
context of unfairly priced deposit insurance.
The overall effect on the stability of the banking system is ambiguous. With opaque
banks, a government bail-out policy may even increase the stability of the system ex
ante, while stability is clearly reduced in the model with transparent banks. Hence
welfare effects depend on the information structure in the banking sector.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 contains a brief review of the related
literature. In section 3, we derive the competitive effects of an asymmetric bail-out
policy for the cases of opaque and transparent banks. In both models, we start by
analyzing the monopoly case before modelling the situation with several banks with
different bail-out probabilities. Welfare implications are analyzed for each model.
Section 4 summarizes our major findings and discusses some extensions to our model.
2 Related literature
Our paper is related to two strands of literature: first, to the extensive literature
on competition and stability in the banking sector, and second, to the literature on
the effects of public bail-out guarantees.
3This is also the time structure chosen by Allen and Gale (2000, chapter 8.3).
4This effect is comparable to that of Keeley (1990) and Allen and Gale (2000, chapter 8).
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The work by Keeley (1990) was the first of a large number of papers to establish the
trade-off between competition and stability in the banking sector. In a simple model,
Keeley shows that the reduction of rents through competition exacerbates the risk-
shifting problem at banks caused by limited liability and/or unfairly priced deposit
insurance.5 Hence, the creation of “charter value” (i. e. the present discounted value
of future rents) through restrictions on competition can induce banks to refrain from
overly risky behavior if the expected loss of the charter value is larger than the gains
from increased risk-taking.
The work by Keeley has been extended in a number of ways, with differing con-
clusions about the existence of the presumed tradeoff. Allen and Gale (2000, chap-
ter 8.3) generalize Keeley’s results in a static agency model, confirming the negative
relationship between competition and stability.6 While the tradeoff appears to be
robust to the introduction of product differentiation,7 it typically breaks down in the
presence of competition in loan markets (and not just deposit markets).8 Dynamic
models yield contradictory results.9
Similar to the theoretical literature, the empirical literature yields ambiguous results
as to the trade-off between competition and stability. Keeley (1990) presents some
evidence for the view that the surge in bank failures in the 1980s in the United
States may be explained by the disappearance of monopoly rents in banking due
to financial deregulation. Similarly, the accumulation of systemic banking crises in
developed and developing countries in the past two decades has been attributed to
financial liberalization, which has also been shown to be accompanied by declining
charter values in banking (see Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1999).10 In contrast,
a recent cross-country study by Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2003) shows that
systemic banking crises are less likely in countries with more concentrated banking
sectors, but more likely in countries with tighter restrictions on entry and bank-
ing activities. These findings are inconsistent with the “charter value hypothesis”,
according to which crises should be less likely in the latter case as well.
The second strand of literature related to our paper concerns the effects of public
bail-out guarantees. With respect to public banks, the literature is scarce. The most
important empirical findings are that government ownership of banks is pervasive
5This literature review is restricted to the papers most closely related to ours. For more detailed
surveys on the relationship between competition and stability in banking, see Canoy, van Dijk,
Lemmen, de Mooij, and Weigand (2001) and Carletti and Hartmann (2003). Allen and Gale
(2004) provide a useful overview of what type of models tend to yield what type of results as to
the sign of the relationship between competition and stability.
6Due to its simplicity and clarity, we chose this framework as the basis of our analysis.
7See Matutes and Vives (2000) and Cordella and Yeyati (2002).
8See Koskela and Stenbacka (2000), Caminal and Matutes (2002), and Boyd and De Nicolo`
(2003).
9See Hellman, Murdoch, and Stiglitz (2000), Perotti and Suarez (2002), and Allen and Gale
(2000, chapter 8.4).
10In a similar vein, Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven, and Levine (2004) find that banks’ interest margins
are higher in countries with tighter restrictions on competition in banking.
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all over the world and that it tends to be associated with more poorly operating
financial systems and slower growth performance.11
In contrast, there exists a fairly large number of papers on the so-called “too-big-
to-fail” (hereafter TBTF) problem. Large banks may be subject to an incentive
problem because the public authorities cannot credibly commit to not supporting
these banks in case of impending failure. The theoretical effects of a TBTF policy
are similar to those of an unfairly priced deposit insurance, namely the complete
insurance of all uninsured deposits and other liabilities at zero costs. Since Merton
(1977), it is well-known that unfair deposit insurance entails a risk-shifting problem,
similar to the problem arising from limited liability.12 Hence one may expect that
a more concentrated banking sector with TBTF banks entails higher risk-taking at
the largest banks, and thus higher fragility. Since a higher concentration implies
less competition, this result is just the opposite of what would be predicted by
the “charter value literature” described above. Our paper aims at resolving this
apparent contradiction.
The TBTF problem also seems to be an empirically relevant phenomenon. Boyd and
Gertler (1994) document a TBTF problem at the largest commercial banks in the
United States in the 1980s. Schnabel (2003, 2004) describes a similar phenomenon
at the so-called “great banks” in Germany at the time of the Great Depression. The
episode studied most intensively is the near-failure of Continental Illinois in 1984
and the consequent public announcement by regulators that the 11 largest US banks
were too big to be allowed fail. In an event study, O’Hara and Shaw (1990) find
significant positive abnormal returns for the TBTF bank after the announcement,
which is consistent with the existence of a positive subsidy to TBTF banks. Studies
using bond market data tend to confirm the existence of conjectural government
guarantees.13
Another strand of the empirical literature looks at the question whether the prospect
of becoming TBTF is a motivation for bank mergers.14 While Benston, Hunter, and
Wall (1995) reject this hypothesis for the years 1981 to 1986, the evidence for the
1990s in Kane (2000) and Penas and Unal (2001) is consistent with the hypothesis.
One striking gap in the literature concerns the impact of a TBTF policy on smaller
banks. O’Hara and Shaw (1990) find negative effects on banks not included in the
list of banks deemed to be “too big to fail” and attribute this finding to the self-
financing character of the deposit insurance system. Apart from this finding, we
were not able to find any theoretical or empirical paper dealing with the banks that
are “too small to be saved”. Our paper contributes to closing this gap.
11See Barth, Caprio, and Levine (1999) and Porta, de Silanes, and Shleifer (2002). For an
analysis of public banks in Germany, see Sinn (1999).
12Empirical evidence for the adverse effects of deposit insurance on banking stability has been
presented by Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002).
13See Flannery and Sorescu (1996) and Morgan and Stiroh (2002).
14This argument is similar to the dynamic arguments in the literature on competition and sta-
bility. It was first stated by Hunter and Wall (1989) and Boyd and Graham (1991).
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3 The model
The basic setup of our model is the same as in Allen and Gale (2000, chapter 8.3).
We consider an economy with n chartered banks, indexed i = 1, . . . , n. Banks collect
deposits and invest their funds in risky projects. They can choose the “risk level” of
their investment by fixing some target return yi per unit invested. Projects yield the
return yi with probability p(yi), otherwise they return zero. The success probability
decreases in the target return, i. e., p′(yi) < 0.15 The volume of deposits collected by
bank i is denoted by di. The aggregate amount of deposits in the economy is named
D =
∑n
i=1 di. Depositors demand an expected return R(D), which increases in the
aggregate volume of deposits, i. e., R′(D) > 0. Banks and depositors are assumed
to be risk neutral.
Up to now, the model is identical to Allen and Gale (2000, chapter 8.3). However,
instead of assuming that deposits are fully insured, bank i is bailed out by the
government with probability βi ∈ (0; 1) in the case of failure.16 The government
can commit itself to the exogenous probability βi.
17 Given the bail-out policy βi,
depositors are repaid with probability p(yi) + βi (1− p(yi)). With probability (1−
βi) (1− p(yi)), they receive nothing. In order to obtain an expected return of R(D),
they demand a nominal return of ρi R(D), where the “default premium” ρi depends
on both βi and yi.
The expected profit of bank i is then a function of four endogenous variables, namely
its risk level yi, the default premium ρi, its deposit volume di, and the competitors’
deposit volume, D−i =
∑
k =i dk = D − di,
Πi(yi, ρi, di, D−i) = p(yi) [yi di − ρi R(di + D−i) di] = p(yi) di [yi − ρi R(D)].
Within this setting, we define two games characterized by different degrees of trans-
parency in the banking sector, modeled through varying time patterns of actions
and information revelation. In each game, we first discuss the monopoly case with
n = 1. This yields insights into the banks’ incentives to take risks and expand
volume, abstracting from competitive effects. These insights prove to be useful in
the subsequent analysis of the oligopoly case.
3.1 Opaque banks
In the first model, banks are opaque in the sense that depositors must set the default
premium ρ before banks choose their deposit volumes d and their target returns y.
15Hence a bank’s probability of default 1− p(yi) is an increasing function with yi.
16Because of the risk neutrality of depositors, βi can just as well be interpreted as the fraction
of deposits that the government refunds in the case of bank failure.
17A relaxation of the exogeneity assumption is discussed in section 4.
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Figure 1: Time structure when banks are opaque
• For each bank i, the government fixes a bail-out probability βi
• Investors (knowing βi and anticipating di and yi) set a default pre-
mium ρi
• Banks choose di (anticipating yi), R(D) is determined in the deposit
market
• Banks choose yi and invest
• Projects mature and return yi with probability p(yi). Banks pay
ρi R(D) to their depositors if possible. Otherwise, the government
pays ρi R(D) with probability βi
Depositors cannot exert any market discipline because they cannot react to the risk-
taking of banks. This time structure (see figure 1) generates a moral hazard problem
between depositors and banks, known as risk-shifting or asset substitution.18
For tractability reasons, we make the following technical assumption throughout
subsection 3.1.19
Assumption 1 R(d) and p(y) do not bend too much in a neighborhood of the equi-
librium, i. e., R′′(d) ≈ 0 and p′′(y) ≈ 0.
3.1.1 The monopoly case
To abstract from competitive effects, we first look at the case with only one bank
(n = 1), such that D = d1. For readability, we omit all indices. As usual, we analyze
18To give the market for deposits a micro foundation, assume that we have an auctioneer who
first asks each infinitesimal depositor j to report her individual supply function rj(D) for deposits,
and the default premium ρji she would demand from each bank i. We assume that depositors
are homogenous and name identical functions rj(D) and values ρji . The auctioneer aggregates
the supply, R(D) =
∫
rj(D) dj, and communicates supply and default premia to the banks. Now
each bank i chooses a volume di and communicates it to the auctioneer. The auctioneer now
determines the aggregate deposit volume D =
∑
i di and the risk-free market rate R(D), and he
fixes the nominal deposit rate ρi R(D) for each bank.
19Here and elsewhere, ≈ denotes an approximation for vanishing second derivatives, i. e.,
R′′(d)→ 0 and p′′(y)→ 0.
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the problem backwards. First, we determine y for given β, d and ρ,20
Π = p(y) d [y − ρR(d)], (1)
∂Π
∂y
= d
[
p(y) + [y − ρR(d)] p′(y)] = 0,
0 = p(y) + [y − ρR(d)] p′(y). (2)
This maximization yields a function y(d, ρ). The relationship between the optimal y
and d can be derived from the implicit equation (2) for y, making use of the implicit
function theorem,
0 = yd p
′(y) + [yd − ρR′(d)] p′(y) + [y − ρR(d)] yd p′′(y),
yd =
ρ
−
p′(y)
+
R′(d)
2 p′(y) + [y − ρR(d)] p′′(y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
> 0.
The intuition for the positive relationship between risk and deposit volume is straight-
forward. Expected profits Π of the bank consist of three factors, the probability of
success p(y), the deposit volume d, and some “margin” given by the difference be-
tween y and the nominal repayment ρR(d). If d rises, ρR(d) goes up, and the
bank compensates the shrinking margin by increasing y. If p′′(y) is small, then
yd ≈ 12 ρR′(d). Hence, the increase in y dampens the original decrease in the margin
by 50 percent.
An analogous procedure can be used to derive yρ,
0 = yρ p
′(y) + [yρ −R(d)] p′(y) + [y − ρR(d)] yρ p′′(y),
yρ =
−
p′(y)
+
R(d)
2 p′(y) + [y − ρR(d)] p′′(y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
> 0.
An increase in ρ reduces the margin, which is compensated by raising the risk level
y. If p′′(y) is small, yρ ≈ 12R(d). Again, the increase in y dampens the original
increase in the margin by 50 percent.21
We now turn to the determination of the deposit volume. Banks choose d given the
default premium ρ and anticipating y. Incorporating the dependence of y on d and
ρ into the profit function (1), the bank’s expected profits are given by
Π = p(y(d, ρ)) d [y(d, ρ)− ρR(d)]. (3)
20We assume that there exists an optimal level of risk, which maximizes the expected return
yi p(yi). Therefore, the second derivative of the expected return must be weakly negative, i. e.
∂2 (yi p(yi))/∂yi2 = 2 p′(yi) + yi p′′(yi) ≤ 0. Under this assumption, the second-order condition of
the profit maximization will always be satisfied.
21Note that both results are driven by the same mechanism, namely a decrease in the margin
that translates into an increase in risk. This mechanism is central to the “charter value literature”.
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The first-order condition to this maximization problem yields an implicit relation
between d and ρ, which we denote by d(ρ). Making use of the implicit function
theorem, one can derive the following lemma.22
Lemma 1 (Optimal d for given ρ) The optimal deposit volume decreases in the
default premium, i. e., d′(ρ) < 0.
Again an increasing default premium reduces the margin y − ρR(d). The bank
can react by either increasing y or decreasing d. It is not immediately clear why
reaching the new optimum could not possibly be based on a strong increase in y,
accompanied by a weak increase in d. Lemma 1 implies that d decreases in any case,
at least if R(d) and p(y) do not bend too much.
Finally, we turn to the determination of the default premium ρ. Anticipating y and
d, depositors set a fair default premium, such that they expect a return of R(d),
R(d) = p(y) ρR(d) + β (1− p(y)) ρR(d),
ρ =
1
p(y) + β (1− p(y)) . (4)
The default premium ρ does not directly depend on d. However, there is an indirect
dependence through y. The resulting function ρ(d) is characterized by lemma 2.
Lemma 2 (Fair ρ for given d) The fair default premium increases in the deposit
volume, i. e., ρ′(d) > 0.
The intuition for this result is as follows: An increase in d reduces the margin
y− ρR(d). The bank compensates this reduction by increasing risk, which must be
taken into account by the depositors by demanding a higher default premium. The
increase in ρ induces further risk shifting, leading to a multiplier effect, reinforcing
the initial effect. Hence, the overall effect on the default premium is positive.
In equilibrium, the default premium must be fair, given the anticipated deposit
volume, and the deposit volume has to be optimal, given the default premium.
Therefore, we can determine the equilibrium by looking at the intersection of the
two curves d(ρ) and ρ(d). Figure 2 displays such equilibria for two different bail-out
policies β, taking into account the results from lemmata 1 and 2. The following
proposition characterizes the effects of different bail-out policies on the equilibrium.
Proposition 1 (Effects of bail-out policy in monopoly with opaque banks)
In an opaque monopolistic banking system, an increase in the bail-out probability in-
duces depositors to demand a lower default premium, ∂ρ/∂β < 0. The bank reacts
by choosing a higher deposit volume, ∂d/∂β > 0. It chooses a higher risk level
(∂y/∂β > 0) if and only if the supply of deposits is inelastic.
22All proofs can be found in the appendix.
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Figure 2: Default premium and deposit volume for varying β in the monopoly
d(ρ)
ρ(d)β=0
ρ(d)β=0.1
d
ρ
0.1
0.2
2 3 4 5
This example is based on the functions p(y) = 1−y and R(d) = d. For comparability,
the same functions are used throughout the paper.
Figure 2 illustrates this proposition. An increase in β implies that depositors are
compensated with a higher probability (or to a higher degree) in the case of bank
failure, which reduces the fair default premium for a given d; hence, the function
ρ(d) is shifted to the left. In contrast, d(ρ) does not depend on β for a given ρ. From
the graph, it is clear that the bank always expands in reaction to an increasing β,
and that the default premium falls. The effect on risk-taking is not obvious, because
the effects of d and ρ on y go into opposite directions. Proposition 1 states that the
overall effect on risk-taking depends on the elasticity of the supply of deposits. If
the supply of deposits is highly elastic, the inverse function R(d) is highly inelastic.
Therefore, the expansion of the bank has little effects on the deposit rate R(d). As
a result, the indirect incentive for risk shifting is negligible. If, on the other hand,
the supply of deposits is highly inelastic, then R(d) is elastic, and an expansion
of d leads to a sharp increase in the deposit rate R(d). In this case, the indirect
incentive to shift risk outweighs the direct incentives for a safer investment strategy.
This ambiguous result is interesting because it contradicts the conventional wisdom
according to which a higher bail-out probability always leads to an increase in risk-
taking.
Summing up, a more generous bail-out policy leads to an expansion of the deposit
volume and a decrease in the default premium. It may lead to an increase or decrease
in risk-taking, depending on the elasticity of the supply of deposits.
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3.1.2 The oligopoly case
Assume now that n banks have been chartered instead of just one. We are interested
in how the market as a whole reacts when the government changes the bail-out policy
for one bank. Without loss of generality, assume that the government raises the bail-
out probability β1 of bank 1. This bank could be thought of as either a large or a
public bank.
Assume for the moment that the deposit volume D−1 of competitor banks is given.
Then proposition 1 implies that, just as in the monopoly case, the increase in β1
leads to a fall in the default premium ρ1. This induces bank 1 to increase its volume
d1.
The question then is how bank 1’s behavior affects the remaining banking sector.
In our model, an interaction between banks takes place only in the deposit market,
namely through the deposit rate R(D). In equilibrium, the deposit volume of each
bank must be an optimal reaction to the volumes of all competitors. Lemma 3
summarizes the strategic interactions in the deposit market.
Lemma 3 (Strategic interactions in the deposit market) The reaction func-
tion of any bank i, di(dj), is a strictly decreasing function. Starting from an equilib-
rium with d1 > 0 and dj > 0, an outward shift of bank 1’s reaction function leads to
an increase in bank 1’s and a decrease in bank j’s deposit volume. Since the former
effect dominates the latter, aggregate deposits D increase.
The first part of lemma 3 implies that deposit volumes are strategic substitutes in
our model. Figure 3 plots the reaction functions for a numerical example. From
proposition 1, we know that the reaction function of bank 1 shifts outward as β1
increases, while the reaction functions of the competitors remain unchanged. The
second part of lemma 3 implies that an increase in β1 leads to an expansion of
deposits at the subsidized bank and a contraction of deposits at the remaining
banks. Finally, the overall effect is an expansion of the deposit volume.
This last point is crucial: It implies that if one bank expands its deposit volume, the
aggregate volume D increases, and so does the market rate R(D) = R(d1 + D−1).
Shrinking margins yj − ρj R(D) imply higher risk-taking by the competitor banks.
In turn, the decrease in the competitors’ deposit volumes induces bank 1 to raise
d1, causing competitor banks to lower their volumes even further. This multiplier
effect continues until a new equilibrium is reached. In the process, the volumes of
some competitors possibly go down to zero, i. e., the banks close.
The following proposition sums up actions and reactions of bank 1 and its competi-
tors.
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Figure 3: Reaction functions in the deposit market for varying β1
d1
dj
d∗1(dj)
d∗j(d1)
0.1
0.1
Black lines stand for β1 = βj = 0.10, the gray line for β1 = 0.13. Equilibria are
indicated by the dotted lines. Note that the increase in d1 is larger than the decrease
in dj such that aggregate deposits increase.
Proposition 2 (Competitive effects of bail-out policy with opaque banks)
In an opaque banking system, an increase in the bail-out probability β1 leads to
1. an expansion of deposits at bank 1 and a contraction of deposits at its com-
petitor banks j = 1, ∂d1/∂β1 > 0 and ∂dj/∂β1 < 0;
2. a reduction in risk at bank 1 if the supply of deposits is not too inelastic (if
ε  1). In any case, the default premium falls, ∂y1/∂β1 < 0 and ∂ρ1/∂β1 < 0;
3. an increase in risk at the competitor banks j, accompanied by higher default
premia, ∂yj/∂β1 > 0 and ∂ρj/∂β1 > 0.
Proposition 2 is illustrated in figure 4 for the case of two banks. As the bail-out
probability β1 rises, d1 rises and bank 1 grows because of this subsidy. The subsidy
leaves bank 1 with low nominal deposit rates ρ1 R(D), therefore bank 1 reduces
its riskiness y1. Due to fiercer competition, bank j is crowded out with dj falling.
For banks j, the nominal rate ρj R(D) rises, leading to an increased risk-shifting
problem, implying an increase in yj. If bail-out policies become too asymmetric
(β1  βj), bank j’s incentives to take risk become overwhelming, inducing depositors
to demand ever higher default premia, which in turn fuel risk-taking, such that the
process reaches no new equilibrium. Then yj jumps to the maximum, p(yj) drops
to zero, and as a result, dj drops to zero, and bank j closes. Bank 1 is left with a
monopoly, as described in section 3.1.1. If β1  βj, the effect is reversed.
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Figure 4: Effects of an asymmetric bail-out policy
y1
yj
d1
dj
y, d
β1
Duopoly
Monopoly →
← Monopoly
1
1βj
Black lines denote risk choices y, gray lines deposit volumes d. Thick lines stand for
bank 1, thin lines for a competitor bank j. In this example, βj = 1/4, so for β1 = 1/4,
both banks are symmetric (light gray vertical line). With rising β1, risk-taking of
bank 1 decreases, whereas bank j takes on more risk. Bank 1 grows, whereas bank j
shrinks. If banks become too asymmetric, one bank may quit the market because of
bone-crushing competition (vertical dotted lines). It then leaves behind a monopoly.
At the same time, the volume of the competitor bank jumps up, whereas risk-taking
drops.
3.1.3 Welfare analysis
We now turn to the overall welfare effects of a bail-out policy. These are not obvious:
On the one hand, the protected bank may become safer, which enhances welfare. On
the other hand, competition in the deposit market intensifies, and the competitor
banks react by taking on more risk. In addition, the aggregate deposit volume
expands. This increases welfare, as more depositors can invest at an interest rate
that beats the opportunity investment which yields R(D). Finally, the bank that
is getting safer grows, whereas the banks that become more risky shrink. This
constitutes a second-order effect in the direction of increasing welfare.
The aggregate welfare generated by the banking system is given by
W =
n∑
i=1
di p(yi) yi −
∫ D
0
R(∆) d∆. (5)
Projects have expected returns of di p(yi) yi. We have to subtract the depositors’
opportunity costs, given by the integral over returns of opportunity investments.
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Figure 5: Aggregate welfare with opaque banks
Welfare
β1
β2 1
Duopoly
Monopoly →
Monopoly
In this example, β2 = 0.1. For β1 = 0.1, both banks are symmetric. For very
asymmetric bail-out policies, one bank quits the market, leaving behind a monopoly
(exactly as in figure 4).
Banks’ expected repayments to depositors are p(yi) di ρi R(D), but these payments
are welfare-neutral. Similarly, the payments from the government are welfare-
neutral, so they do not appear in (5).
In the monopoly case, the protection of the bank tends to increase welfare. The
reason is that, if the supply elasticity of deposits is moderate, then risk-taking
is scarcely affected by the protection. Still, the deposit volume expands, tending
towards the competitive level. This leads to an increase in welfare. However, for
extremely inelastic supply, one can find numerical examples where welfare decreases
if the bail-out probability becomes too large because the welfare loss due to excessive
risk-taking exceeds the welfare gain because of deposit volume expansion.
Now let us to look at the oligopoly case. Figure 5 displays aggregate welfare as a
function of the bail-out probability β1 for one specific numerical example with two
banks. We see that welfare increases when the asymmetry in β increases. With a
large degree of asymmetry, the less subsidized banks becomes very weak, leaving
the highly subsidized bank in a rather strong competitive position. The result is a
near-monopoly for the highly subsidized bank. The large rents induce the strong
bank to choose a low risk level, which increases welfare, just as in the monopoly
case. While this result is not general, it illustrates nicely that welfare may be both
increasing and decreasing in the bail-out probability of the subsidized bank.
If one took the results from this analysis literally, the economic policy conclusions
would be clear: With unrestricted resources, the best a benevolent government
could do is to bail-out all banks in case of default. With restricted resources, an
asymmetric bail-out policy may be optimal, i. e., the welfare-maximizing government
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Figure 6: Time structure when banks are transparent
• For each bank i, the government fixes a bail-out probability βi
• Banks choose yi (anticipating di and ρi)
• Banks choose di (knowing βi and yi), R(D) is determined in the
deposit market
• Investors observe yi and set a default premium ρi, banks invest
• Projects mature and return yi with probability p(yi). Banks pay
ρi R(D) to their depositors if possible. Otherwise, the government
pays ρi R(D) with probability βi
should fix β = 1 for as many banks as it can afford, and β = 0 for the rest. This result
is not surprising. It is just another way of saying that restrictions of competition
may enhance welfare, as has also been claimed in the literature on competition and
banking stability.23
3.2 Transparent banks
Our second model deals with transparent banks. Here the time structure is reversed
(see figure 6), such that depositors can observe their bank’s risk choice and the level
of deposits before setting default premia. Therefore, depositors can (and do) exert
market discipline. In making their risk choices, banks must take into account that
they are directly punished for excessive risk-taking by increased nominal deposit
rates because of higher default premia. This reduces risk shifting. If β = 0 (the
bank is never bailed out), there is no risk shifting at all. If β > 0, there is again a risk-
shifting problem, this time arising from the problem that the implicit government
guarantee is cost free.24
To keep our proofs tractable, we again have to make a technical assumption, valid
throughout subsection 3.2:
Assumption 2 βi > 0 is not too large for all banks i, i. e., βi ≈ 0.
23See the literature review in section 2.
24As an alternative time structure, one may assume that banks can observe their mutual risk
choices when fixing volumes in the deposit market. In this case, banks will tend to choose higher
risk levels for strategic reasons: Since a bank’s optimal deposit volume rises in its exposure to
risk, competitor banks interpret increased risk-taking as a commitment to choose a high volume
afterwards in the deposit market. Numerical calculations suggest that our main results remain
valid in this case.
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3.2.1 The monopoly case
Again we start with the monopoly case to abstract from competitive effects. First,
we determine the default premium ρ, given the level of deposits d and the bank’s
risk choice y. The expression for ρ looks exactly as in (4),
ρ =
1
p(y) + β (1− p(y)) . (6)
ρ increases in y and does not depend directly on d. Furthermore, it decreases in β.
In the extreme case with β = 1, there is no default premium, independent of the
chosen risk level, i. e., ρ = 1. We can directly incorporate the fair default premium
into the expected profit function (1),
Π = p(y) d
(
y − R(d)
p(y) + β (1− p(y))
)
. (7)
Now there are only two endogenous variables left, y and d. First, we determine the
optimal level of deposits d for a given β and y,25
∂Π
∂d
= p(y)[y − ρ(y)R(d)]− p(y) d ρ(y)R′(d) != 0,
0 = y − ρ(y) [R(
+
d) + dR′(
+
d)]. (8)
This first-order condition implicitly defines a function d(y). We see that an increase
in d has two effects: First, it increases profits at a given margin; second, it decreases
the margin due to an increase in the deposit rate R(d). At the optimum, these two
effects just balance.
In order to determine the effect of y on the choice of d, we make use of the implicit
function theorem,
0 = 1− ρ′(y) [R(d) + dR′(d)] + ρ(y) dy [2R′(d) + dR′′(d)],
dy =
1−
+
ρ′(y) [
+
R(d) + dR′(d)]
ρ(y)
+
[2R′(d) + dR′′(d)
+
]
. (9)
One can distinguish a direct effect and an indirect effect working through ρ. The
direct effect is positive: An increase in y directly increases the target return and,
hence, the margin, inducing the bank to expand its deposit volume. However, a rise
in y also affects the default premium ρ positively, and the corresponding decrease
in the margin leads to a countervailing effect on d. Lemma 4 states that the direct
effect dominates the indirect effect, at least for small β.
25Again we assume that there always exists a solution to the profit maximization problem, i. e.,
that the second-order condition is always satisfied. A sufficient condition is
[
2R′(d)+dR′′(d)
] ≥ 0.
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Lemma 4 (Optimal d for given y) In the neighborhood of the optimal y, dy > 0.
The example β = 0 conveys much of the intuition. For any β, the bank will choose
the highest deposit volume when its expected return from the project is maximal.
If the bail-out probability is zero, the bank’s optimal risk choice coincides with the
first-best level of risk. Hence, the function d(y) will have a maximum at the first-
best y, such that dy = 0 at this point; the direct and the indirect effect on d just
cancel at this point. For β > 0 and y close to the first-best, the direct effect on d
is stronger than the indirect effect since the increase in ρ does not reflect the full
increase in risk. Hence, the volume-maximizing y will be larger than the first-best,
and the function d(y) will be strictly increasing at the first-best. Figure 7 shows the
function d(y) for different choices of β.
In the final step, we determine the bank’s optimal risk choice. Anticipating d and
ρ, banks choose an optimal risk level y. By deriving the profit function with respect
to y, we get the following implicit relation,26
Π = p(y) d [y − ρ(y)R(d)] ,
∂Π
∂y
= p′(y) d [y − ρ(y)R(d)] + p(y) d [1− ρ′(y)R(d)] = 0,
0 = p′(y) [y − ρ(y)R(d)] + p(y) [1− ρ′(y)R(d)] . (10)
An increase in y has two effects: First, it decreases profits through the success
probability; second, it increases profits through a rising margin. Again, these two
effects just balance at the optimum.
Using the usual procedure, one can derive the relationship between y and d,
yd =
+
R′(d) [
−
p′(y) ρ(y) + p(y)
+
ρ′(y)]
p′′(y) [y − ρ(y)R(d)] + 2 p′(y) [1− ρ′(y)R(d)]− p(y) ρ′′(y)R(d) . (11)
The denominator of this equation is negative if we assume that a solution to the op-
timization problem exists. In the numerator, we can distinguish two countervailing
effects: First, a rise in d mitigates the effect of y on the success probability, inducing
the bank to raise y. Second, an increasing d also mitigates the effect of y on the
margin, reducing the bank’s incentive to raise y. The following lemma states that
the first effect always dominates the second.
Lemma 5 (Optimal y for given d) yd ≥ 0, and yd = 0 if and only if β = 0.
26Usually, one would first plug in the function d(y) and then derive the profit function with
respect to y. Due to the envelope theorem, the two procedures are equivalent.
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Figure 7: Risk level and deposit volume for varying β in the monopoly
y
d
y(d)β=0
y(d)β=0.3
y(d)β=1
d(y)β=0
d(y)β=0.3
d(y)β=1
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.5 0.6 0.7
Dotted lines refer to y(d), gray lines to d(y) for β = 0, 0.3 and 1. Equilibria (i. e.,
intersections of curves pertaining to the same β) are marked by the solid black curve.
As predicted in lemma 4, d(y) rises with y near the equilibrium; it is locally constant
only for β = 0. y(d) rises with d, it is constant even globally if β = 0. Furthermore,
the curve d(y) moves up when β rises. The curve y(d) moves to the right for rising
β if β is small, but bends back to the left for large d. Still, the curve describing the
equilibria is monotonous, i. e., yβ > 0 and dβ > 0.
Intuitively, for β = 0 the two effects always add up to zero because any increase in
y is accompanied by a “fair” increase in ρ. The bank therefore always opts for the
first-best risk level, which is constant, hence yd = 0 in this case. For β > 0, the
increase in ρ is less than fair, and the bank has an incentive to increase y above the
first-best level even if part of the increase in returns is eaten up by the resulting
rise in the default premium ρ(y). Figure 7 displays the function y(d) for different
choices of β.
The equilibria are given by the intersections of the curves pertaining to the same β.
d must be optimal given y and vice versa. We are interested in the reaction of the
optimal y and d to a change in β.
First, we examine how the curve d(y) moves when β rises. At a given risk level
y, an increase in β leads to a decrease in ρ. This induces the bank to expand its
deposit volume d. Hence, the curve d(y) shifts upwards. The movement of y(d) is
somewhat more complicated: On the one hand, an increase in β lowers ρ and thus
reinforces the effect working through the success probability. This induces the bank
to reduce y. On the other hand, an increase in β lowers the influence of y on the
default premium ρ, i. e., ρ′(y) falls. Therefore, raising risk is less costly for the bank,
giving the bank an incentive to raise y. Hence, the movement of the curve is not
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monotonous.27 One can show, however, that the second effect dominates the first
one for small β.
The following proposition characterizes the effect of an increase in the bail-out prob-
ability on the equilibrium choices of y and d.
Proposition 3 (Effects of bail-out policy in monopoly with transparent banks)
In a transparent monopolistic banking system, an increase in the bail-out probability
induces the bank to raise its deposit volume d and choose a higher risk y. The default
premium ρ decreases if R(d) is small enough.
The monopolist bank reacts to the subsidization by the government by increasing
risk and expanding its deposit volume because part of the potential losses can be
shifted to the government. This implies that, just as in the model with opaque
banks, conditions on the deposit market tighten, i. e., R(d) will rise. The effect on
ρ is not immediately clear because there are two countervailing effects: the rise in
β and the rise in y. Proposition 3 states that the effect of the rising β dominates,
at least for small β.
3.2.2 The oligopoly case
Now we turn to the oligopoly case with n banks. Banks first announce yi simul-
taneously; then they simultaneously take in deposits di. Analytically, we first
have to solve the system (∂Πi/∂di = 0)i, and then in a second step the system
(∂Πi/∂yi = 0)i. As in section 3.1.2, assume without loss of generality that the
government raises β1.
The chain of reactions is almost identical to the one in section 3.1.2. First, there is a
direct effect on bank 1, taking the deposit volume of competitors as given: The rise
in β leads to an increase in bank 1’s risk and deposit volume (see proposition 3).
In a second step, we analyze the reactions of competitor banks j = 1 to the increase
in d1, neglecting for the moment further reactions of bank 1. Lemma 6 summarizes
the reactions of dj and yj.
28
Lemma 6 (Reactions of competitors) An increase in D−j leads to
1. a decrease in bank j’s deposit volume, i. e., ∂dj/∂D−j < 0, and
27This can also be seen in the example in figure 7.
28Note that, in addition to assumption 2, we have to make assumption 1 from subsection 3.1 for
the proofs of lemma 6 and proposition 4.
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2. an increase in bank j’s risk, i. e., ∂yj/∂D−j > 0.
The effects of an increase in D−j (or d1 in our case) work through a rising deposit
rate R(D). As before, this induces bank j to raise its risk level yj and to lower
its deposit volume dj. Just as in the case with opaque banks, deposit volumes
are strategic substitutes. In fact, banks’ reactions functions look very similar as in
figure 3 with slightly different slopes.29
Finally, we must take into account that the subsidized bank’s deposit volume rises in
reaction to the competitor banks’ contraction of deposits, in turn inducing a further
decrease in deposits at the competitor banks. This multiplier effect continues until
a new equilibrium is reached. The effect on total deposits will again be positive, as
in figure 3. As a result, the market rate rises, and competitors’ risk levels increase
accordingly.
Proposition 4 summarizes the reactions of bank 1 and its competitors.
Proposition 4 (Competitive effects of bail-out policy with transparent banks)
In a transparent banking system, an increase in the bail-out probability β1 leads to
1. an expansion of deposits at bank 1 and a contraction of deposits at its com-
petitor banks j = 1, i. e., ∂d1/∂β1 > 0 and ∂dj/∂β1 < 0;
2. an increase in risk at bank 1, but a decrease in the default premium (if R(D)
is not too large), i. e., ∂y1/∂β1 > 0 and ∂ρ1/∂β1 < 0;
3. an increase in risk at the competitor banks j, accompanied by higher default
premia, i. e., ∂yj/∂β1 > 0 and ∂ρj/∂β1 > 0.
The proposition is illustrated in figure 8 for the case of two banks. As the bail-out
probability β1 rises, bank 1 grows, while bank j is crowded out. Since the increase in
d1 is larger than the decrease in dj, the aggregate deposit volume increases, leading
to a higher market rate R(D). As a result, the risk-shifting problem at bank j is
exacerbated. Opposite to proposition 2, y1 also increases.
The most important result is that the competitive effects of the bail-out policy on
the remaining banking sector are independent of the time and information structure
of the model: In both of our models, the subsidized bank expands, causing a rise in
the market rate, which aggravates the risk-shifting problems at competitor banks.
29In the special case of R′′(d) = 0, reaction functions are linear.
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Figure 8: Effects of an asymmetric bail-out policy
y1
y2
d1
d2
0.2
β2 = 0.3
0.5
0.7
0 1
Black lines denote risk choices y, gray lines deposit volumes d. Thick lines stand
for bank 1, thin lines for a competitor bank j. In this example, βj = 0.3, so for
β1 = 0.3, both banks are symmetric. With rising β1, risk and deposit volume of
bank 1 increase. Due to fiercer competition in the deposit market, bank j reacts by
reducing its deposit volume dj and and increasing its risk y2. The aggregate level of
deposits increases. Interestingly, the effect of competition on risk-taking may be even
stronger than the direct effect: The curves of y1 and yj intersect when β1 becomes
large.
3.2.3 Welfare analysis
When banks are transparent, the welfare effects of an asymmetric bail-out policy
are straightforward. With β positive for all banks, we start from a situation where
risk-taking is above the first-best level. In proposition 4, we have shown that an
increase in the bail-out probability of some bank leads to a further increase in risk-
taking at all banks. Therefore, a policy increasing the bail-out probability β for any
bank is always welfare decreasing.
4 Conclusion
We started from the question of how government bail-out policies affect competition
in the banking sector. While the existing literature has focused mainly on the effects
of bail-out policies on the bank that enjoys the public guarantee, we are mainly
interested in the competitive effects of such policies on the remaining banking sector.
We have presented two types of models, differing only with respect to their time
and information structures. In the first model with opaque banks, risk-taking is
unobservable by depositors, such that there is no market discipline. Therefore, a
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bank’s risk choice does not affect its refinancing costs directly. In the second model
with transparent banks, investments are perfectly observable, and depositors exert
market discipline. As a consequence, deposit rates react promptly to a bank’s risk
choice.
Our main contribution is to show that an increase in the bail-out probability of
one bank unambiguously leads to an increase in the risk-taking of the competitor
banks. At the same time, competitor banks are crowded out. In contrast, the effect
on the protected bank’s risk-taking depends on the degree of transparency in the
banking system. If banks are opaque, the protected bank may take less risk, while it
always assumes more risk in a transparent environment. This qualifies the existing
literature that suggests that an increase in the bail-out probability always leads to
higher risk-taking at the protected bank. As a direct consequence, the welfare effects
of raising the bail-out probability are ambiguous in an opaque setting: welfare may,
but does not necessarily increase. In contrast, welfare clearly decreases in the case
of transparent banks.
Note that the competitive effects are particularly strong in the opaque setting. The
reason is a multiplier effect whereby the original effect from risk-taking on the default
premium is reinforced through the feedback from the default premium to risk-taking.
Therefore, the observation that protected banks do not take higher risks would be
anything but reassuring.
There is a number of interesting extensions to our paper. One of the most important
issues is the determination of the bail-out probability. In our model, this probability
is determined outside of the model. In the case of public banks, one can reasonably
argue that the bail-out probability is exogenous. In contrast, the bail-out probability
should depend on the size of banks in the case of a “too-big-to-fail” policy. By
allowing the bail-out probability to depend on size, we would get an additional
strategic effect. Since high bail-out probabilities are beneficial for banks, a strategic
tendency towards increased volume would develop. This raises the deposit rate,
exacerbating the risk-shifting problem.
Another extension concerns the chosen market structure. In our model, the only
market where banks interact is the market for deposits, and this interaction is mod-
elled in a Cournot fashion. Therefore, one may change the market structure of our
model in two ways. First, competition in the market for deposits may be modelled as
price competition with product differentiation or transportation costs.30 We believe
that our central result remains valid, such that competitor banks are still pushed
towards higher risk-taking. Suppose, for example, that banks are located on a Salop
circle and that the bail-out probability of one bank increases. The direct effect is
a fall in the default premium of the protected bank, leading to cheaper refinance
opportunities. In reaction, the protected bank will expand. Neighboring banks find
30This has been done, e. g., by Matutes and Vives (2000) and Cordella and Yeyati (2002), however
without considering government bail-outs.
Banks without Parachutes – June 16, 2004 22
themselves threatened by the competition from the protected bank and may react
by increasing their deposit rates to regain some “territory” and move away from
the protected banks. This effect spills over to the neighbors of the neighbors and
so forth. In equilibrium, all competitor banks have lost some territory and have
increased their deposit rates, accompanied by higher risk-taking.
Second, competition may take place in the market for loans, and not only in the
deposit market. In this case, it is less clear that our main result is still valid. In fact,
the paper by Boyd and De Nicolo` (2003) has shown that the main effect driving the
“charter-value” literature – and our model – disappears, once one introduces com-
petition in deposit and loan markets simultaneously. However, there are a number
of different ways how to introduce competition in the loan market. We conjecture
that the results would depend on the exact model specification.
As a normative implication of our model, governments should refrain from bail-out
policies, especially in transparent banking markets. Regulatory initiatives towards
greater transparency should be accompanied by a “zero bail-out policy”, if such a
policy is at all credible. The welfare effects of bail-out policies on the competitor
banks are always detrimental. Only the subsidized bank may profit, at the cost of
an increased instability of the remaining banking sector. Market transparency and
government intervention are substitutes, they should never prevail at the same time.
A Appendix
A.1 Proofs for opaque banks
A.1.1 The monopoly case
Proof of lemma 1: Because of the monopoly, D = d. Assume that p′′(y) and R′′(d)
are small in the neighborhood of the equilibrium (for a given β). Then there are
good Taylor approximations,
p(y) ≈ p(y∗) + (y − y∗) p′(y∗),
R(d) ≈ R(d∗) + (d− d∗)R′(d∗).
For readability, we define
p0 := p(y
∗)− y∗ p′(y∗), p1 := −p′(y∗),
R0 := R(d
∗)− d∗ R′(d∗), R1 := R′(d∗),
which implies
p(y) ≈ p0 − p1 y, (12)
R(d) ≈ R0 + R1 d. (13)
Banks without Parachutes – June 16, 2004 23
Then
Π = d (p0 − p1 y) (y − ρ (R0 + R1 d)),
∂Π
∂y
= d (p0 − p1 y) + d p1 (y − ρ (R0 + R1 d)) != 0,
y(d, ρ) =
p0 + p1 (R0 + R1 d) ρ
2 p1
, (14)
Π =
d (p0 − p1 (R0 + R1 d) ρ)2
4 p1
.
We get two determining equations for d and ρ,
∂Π
∂d
=
(p0 − p1 (R0 + dR1) ρ) (p0 − p1 (R0 + 3 dR1) ρ)
4 p1
!
= 0 and (15)
ρ =
2
2β + (1− β) [p0 − p1 (R0 + dR1) ρ] . (16)
There is one meaningful solution,
d =
(−√2 − 12 (1− β) p1 R0) p0 − 6 p1 R0
18 p1 R1
and (17)
ρ =
6
−√2 − 12 (1− β) p1 R0 with (18)
 = 3β + (1− β) p0.
Three problems may occur: First, d may become zero if β is small. The moral
hazard problem is then so large that the depositor prefers not to lend at all,
d ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ β ≤ p0 (3− p0) + 6 (p1 R0 +
√
p1 R0 (3− p0 + p1 R0))
(3− p0)2 .
Second, if β is small, there may be no ρ that compensates investors for the risk. A
higher ρ leads to higher risk shifting y, which again induces a higher ρ. For small
β, this vicious circle may have no fixed point (the term in the square root becomes
negative),
2 − 12 (1− β) p1 R0 ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ β ≥ p1 R0
p0
.
However, if
R0 ≥ p
2
0
(3 + p0) p1
,
the effect of d going to zero is larger. Third, y may be so small that p(y) becomes
larger than one. We have
p(y) ≤ 1 ⇐⇒ p0 ≤ 3 + p1 R0. (19)
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This problem is of purely algebraical nature, because we have assumed that p(y) =
p0 − y p1 is a good approximation to an actual, possibly nonlinear probability dis-
tribution in a region around the choice of y. If this is the case, (19) gives no further
constraint.
Now let us come back to the discussion of the solution of equations (15). Making
use of the implicit function theorem,
∂2Π˜
∂d2
= −1
2
(2 p0 − p1 (2R0 + 3 dR1) ρ)
= −
3R1
(
p0
(
+
√
2 − (1− β) 12 p1 R0
)− 6 p1 R0)(
+
√
2 − (1− β) 12 p1 R0
)2 ,
∂2Π˜
∂d ∂ρ
= −1
2
(p0 (R0 + 2 dR1)− p1 (R0 + dR1)(R0 + 3 dR1) ρ)
= −
p0
(
p0
(
+
√
2 − (1− β) 12 p1 R0
)− 6 p1 R0)
36 p1
,
∂d
∂ρ
= −∂
2Π˜
/
∂d ∂ρ
∂2Π˜
/
∂d2
= −p0
(
+
√
2 − (1− β) 12 p1 R0
)2
108 p1 R1
, (20)
which is clearly negative. 
Proof of lemma 2: The equation that determines ρ is easier to discuss,
ρ =
1
p(y)
⇐⇒ ρ p(y)− 1 = 0. (21)
In the case of a deposit insurance of β (in the case of bankruptcy, depositors still
receive a fraction β of the face value), (21) becomes
ρ =
1
p(y) + β (1− p(y)) ⇐⇒ ρ [p(y) + β (1− p(y))]− 1 = 0. (22)
The default premium ρ clearly does not depend directly on deposit volume d. How-
ever, there are two indirect effects. First, an increase of d leads to a rising R(d),
which induces the bank to raise y. This reduces p(y), the depositors ask a higher ρ.
Second, this increased ρ brings the bank to increase y even further, which leads to
a further increase of ρ. Luckily, both effects point into the same direction. Mathe-
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matically, derive (22) with respect to d, considering that y = y(d, ρ(d)),
0 = ρ′(d) [p(y) + β (1− p(y))] + ρ yρ ρ′(d) p′(y) (1− β) + ρ yd p′(y) (1− β)
=
ρ′(d)
ρ
+ ρ p′(y) (1− β) [yρ ρ′(d) + yd],
ρ′(d) = − (1− β) ρ
2
−
p′(y) yd
1 + (1− β) ρ2 p′(y)
−
yρ
. (23)
The effects described above are identifiable: (1− β) ρ2 (−p′(y)) yd is the first effect,
the multiplier effect is embodied in the factor 1/[1 + (1 − β) ρ2 p′(y) yρ]. Because
the denominator is smaller than 1, the whole fraction is greater than the numerator
alone. If the denominator converges to 0, this implies that risk becomes so large
that it cannot be compensated by a finite ρ any longer. Hence in the area of finite
ρ, we have ρ′(d) > 0. 
Proof of proposition 1: In lemma 1, we have already shown that ρ(d) is an increasing
function. Lemma 2 proves that d(ρ) is decreasing (if p′′(y) ≈ 0 and R′′(d) ≈ 0).
Clearly, d(ρ) does not depend from β. We now show that ρ(d) moves to the left
when β increases,
0 = ρ [1− β (1− p(y))]− 1, (24)
0 = ρ′(β) [1− β (1− p(y))] + ρ (1− p(y)),
∂ρ
∂β
= −ρ 1− p(y)
1− β (1− p(y)) = −
1− p(y)
(1− β (1− p(y)))2 < 0. (25)
This implies a leftward shift of the function ρ(d). We have shown that ∂ρ/∂β < 0
and if p(y) and R(d) do not bend too much, ∂d/∂β > 0. The effect on y is not
immediately clear, because the increase of d leads to a higher y whereas the decrease
of ρ reduces y. Intuition tells that because the decrease of ρ is a direct consequence
of a rising β, the risk level y should fall. We look at y from (14) and substitute d
and ρ as given in (17) and (18) and get
y =
5− 12β +√2 − 12 (1− β) p1 R0
6 p1 (1− β) ,
∂y
∂β
=
2 p1 R0 (1− β)−+
√
2 − 12 (1− β) p1 R0
2 p1 (1− β)2
√
2 − 12 (1− β) p1 R0
.
This derivative swaps sign in two cases: for p0 = 3+ p1 R0 and for R0 = 0. Because
of (19), we know that p0 < 3+p1 R0 as long as p(y) < 1, hence we need to look only
at the case R0 = 0. For R0 < 0, the sign of ∂y/∂β is positive, whereas for R0 > 0, it
is negative. The remaining task is to interpret the sign of R0 in terms of elasticities.
We have
R(D) = R0 + R1 D ⇐⇒ D(R) = (R−R0)/R1,
ε =
∂D
∂R
R
D
=
1
R1
RR1
R−R0 =
R
R−R0 .
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Clearly, the elasticity ε is smaller than one if R0 is positive, and vice versa. 
A.1.2 The oligopoly case
Proof of lemma 3: We first show that a banks deposit volume shrinks and risk
rises as competitors’ deposit volume expands. Assume that β1 is changed. As in the
proof of lemma 2, we use the linear approximations (12) and (13). Expected profits
for a competitor bank j = 1 are then
Πj = dj (p0 − p1 yi) (yi − ρi (R0 + R1 D)),
yj(D, ρj) =
p0 + p1 (R0 + R1 D) ρj
2 p1
,
Π˜j =
dj (p0 − p1 (R0 + R1 D) ρj)2
4 p1
.
Analogously to (15) and (16), one can use ∂Π˜i/∂di = 0 and ρi = 1/[p(yi) + β (1 −
p(yi))] to calculate di and ρi,
di =
(−√2 − 12 (1− βi) p1 (R0 + D−i R1)) p0 − 6 p1 (R0 + D−i R1)
18 p1 R1
and
ρi =
6
−√2 − 12 (1− βi) p1 (R0 + D−i R1) with
 = 3βi + (1− βi) p0.
Apparently, if D−j grows, both curves dj(ρj) and ρj(dj) move, as in figure 9. The
slope of the curves is the same as in figure 2 in the monopoly case.
It remains to check where the intersection point moves when D−j rises. From fig-
ure 9, at least ∂dj/∂D−j < 0 seems evident (both curves move downwards). For-
mally,
∂dj
∂D−j
= − 36 p1 R1
∆(+∆)2 < 0 with (26)
∆ =
√
2 − (1− βj) 12 p1 (R0 + D−j R1)
∂ρj
∂D−j
= −− 3βj +∆
3∆
< 0, (27)
∂yj
∂D−j
=
R1
∆
> 0, (28)
which proves our first assertion.
We now show that a competitor’s increase in volume is compensated by a bank,
but still the aggregate effect on volume remains positive. Be d∗1, . . . , d
∗
n the initial
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Figure 9: Relation between Volume and default premium, Varying D−j
dj(ρj)
ρj(dj)
dj
ρj
0.1
3 4 5
Black lines stand for D−i = 0, gray lines for D−i = 1/30.
equilibrium levels of deposit volumes. Then β1 rises marginally, and equilibrium
levels adjust to d∗∗1 , . . . , d
∗∗
n . We have a closer look at the adjustment process. We
have already shown that the direct effect of the rise of β1 is an expansion of d1. We
have also shown that this leads to a contraction of d2, . . . , dn. However, and this
is the crucial argument, the D expands, because when d2, . . . , dn contract so much
that the original D∗ is reached again, for each bank j = 1 the choice d∗j is again
optimal, only bank 1 chooses a d1 > d
∗
1.
As shown above, the contraction of d2, . . . , dn leads to a further expansion of d1,
which again entails a further contraction of d2, . . . , dn. Eventually, this convergence
process comes to an end. Possibly, di = 0 for some i ∈ {2, . . . , n}. The above
argument that the contraction of d2, . . . , dn never overcompensates the expansion of
d1 holds true, hence in the new equilibrium
d∗∗1 > d
∗
1, d
∗∗
j > d
∗
j for all j ∈ {2 . . . , n}, and D∗∗ > D∗,
which shows our second assertion. 
Proof of proposition 2: Not much remains to be shown. The direct effects on
the affected bank 1 are as in the monopoly case: ρ1 falls and d1 rises. As in the
monopoly case, the effect on risk taking y1 depends on the supply elasticity of
deposits. However, the elasticity of individual supply is larger than that of aggregate
supply. To see this in the case of moderate aggregate elasticity (ε ≈ 1), determine
the individual elasticity if bank 1 as
ε1 =
∂d1
∂R(D)
R(D)
d1
≈ 1
1 + ∂D−1/∂d1
d1 + D−1
d1
> 1.
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Hence the protected bank increases risk only if the supply elasticity of deposits is
considerably lower than one.
The indirect effect is a fall of d2, . . . , dn, which leads to a further rise of d1 and a
further fall of y1 and ρ1. The effect on the other banks j stems from the rise of their
competitors’ deposit volume D−j: di falls, yj rises and ρj falls (cf. (26), (27), and
(28)). 
A.2 Proofs for transparent banks
A.2.1 The monopoly case
Proof of lemma 4: Substituting ρ(y) = 1/[p(y) + β (1− p(y))], we get
dy ≈ β + (1− β) [p(y) + y p
′(y)]
2R′(d) + dR′′(d)
.
Now if β ≈ 0, then p′(y) + y p(y) ≈ 0. Substituting this into (11) yields
dy ≈ β
2R′(d) + dR′′(d)
> 0,
which was to be shown. 
Proof of lemma 5:
In order to find out yd, we derive (7) with regard to d and get
∂Π
∂y
= d
(
p′(y)
[
y − R(d)
p(y) + β (1− p(y))
]
+ p(y)
[
1 +
(1− β) p′(y)R(d)
(p(y) + β (1− p(y)))2
])
= 0,
0 = [p(y) + y p′(y)] [p(y) + β (1− p(y))]2 − β p′(y)R(d), (29)
0 = yd [2 p
′(y) + y p′′(y)] [p(y) + β (1− p(y))]2
+ [p(y) + y p′(y)] 2 (1− β) yd p′(y) [p(y) + β (1− p(y))]
− β (yd p′′(y)R(d) + p′(y)R′(d)). (30)
If we assume that β is not too large and hence p′(y)+ y p(y) ≈ 0 in (30), solving for
yd we get
yd =
β p(y)R′(d)
β y p′′(y)
−
R(d)
+
− [y (2 p′(y) + y p′′(y))
−
] [p(y) + β (1− p(y))
+
]2
.
Again, if β is small, then β y p′′(y) becomes small and the denominator is positive.
Because R′(d) = 0, the derivative yd can vanish only if β = 0. 
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Proof of proposition 3: We first show that c. p., volume d increases as β increases.
The equation determining d implicitly is
0 = y (p(y) + β (1− p(y))) + R(d) + dR′(d)
0 = y (1− p(y)) + dβ (2R′(d) + R′′(d))
dβ =
y (1− p(y))
2R′(d) + dR′′(d)
> 0.
Clearly, dβ > 0.
Next, we show that also y rises as β rises. The equation determining y implicitly is
(29),
0 = [p(y) + y p′(y)] [p(y) + β (1− p(y))]2 − β p′(y)R(d),
0 = yβ [2 p
′(y) + y p′′(y)] [p(y) + β (1− p(y))]2
+ [p(y) + y p′(y)] 2 [p(y) + β (1− p(y))] [1− p(y) + yβ (1− β) p′(y)]
−R(d) p′(y). (31)
If β is not too large, then p′(y) + y p(y) ≈ 0, and (31) simplifies to
0 = yβ [y
2 p′′(y)− 2 p(y)] [p(y) + β (1− p(y))]− [y β yβ p′′(y)− p(y)]R(d)
yβ = − p(y)R(d)
[y2 p′′(y)− 2 p(y)
−
] [p(y) + β (1− p(y))
+
]− y β p′′(y)
−
R(d)
. (32)
Here, ∂2(y p(y))/∂y2 = 2 p′(y)+y p′′(y) < 0, otherwise there is no solution to the first
best problem. Therefore, −2 p(y)/y + y p′′(y) < 0, and hence y2 p′′(y)− 2 p(y) < 0.
Because of the assumption that β is small, the first addend in the denominator
dominates the second. As a result, yβ > 0.
Summing up, the increase of β leads directly to a rise of y and d. Because both yd
and dy are positive (cf. lemma 4 and 5), there is a multiplier effect into the same
direction. Now look at the effect on ρ. Clearly, ρ falls if p(y) + β (1 − p(y)) rises.
Therefore, examine
∂(p(y) + β (1− p(y)))
∂β
= yβ p
′(y) + (1− p(y))− β yβ p′(y)
= 1− p(y) + (1− β) yβ p′(y).
Now incorporate (32) and consider p(y) + y p′(y) ≈ 0, then the term becomes
1− p(y) + (1− β) p(y)
2 R(d)
[y2 p′′(y)− 2 p(y)] [p(y) + β (1− p(y))]− y β p′′(y)R(d)
β≈0≈ 1− p(y) + R(d)
y
(y2 p′′(y)− 2 p(y)
−
).
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This is positive whenever R(d) is small enough,
R(d) < y (1− p(y)) (2 p(y)− y2 p′′(y)). (33)
Note that this is the condition for the case that β is small, hence that y is close
to the first best case. As β becomes larger, (33) may be overly strict. I numerical
calculations (e. g., in the example p(y) = 1−y and R(d) = d), ρ rises with β globally,
even when (33) does not hold. 
A.2.2 The oligopoly case
Proof of lemma 6: The proof falls into three steps, as becomes clear from fig-
ure 10. We first show that if D−j rises, the curve dj(yj) goes down. Second, under
somewhat stricter conditions, the curve yj(dj) moves up. Finally, we look at the
contemporaneous reaction of the optimal y and d.
Figure 10: Relation between Volume and Risk, Varying D−j
yj
dj
dj(yj)|D−j=.1
dj(yj)|D−j=.0
yj(dj)|D−j=.0
yj(dj)|D−j=.1
y∗(D−j), d∗(D−j)
0.1
0.2
0.5 0.6 0.7
This figure is the analogy to figure 9. Dashed lines show the optimal dj(yj), gray
lines show yj(dj) for βj = 0.2 and D−j = 0 and 0.1. Equilibria (i. e., intersections of
curves pertaining to the same d1) are marked by the solid black curve. This example
is based on the functions p(y) = 1− y and R(d) = d.
Claim If the competitors deposit volume D−j rises, the curve defining the optimal
deposit volume dj of bank j given the risk choice yj goes down (∂dj(yj)/∂D−j < 0).
Proof of the claim: The equation that implicitly determines the optimal dj given
yj and D−j is
∂Πj
∂dj
= 0 = yj
(
p(yj) + βj (1− p(yj))
)
+ R(dj + D−j) + dj R′(dj + D−j), . (34)
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Taking the derivative with regard to D−j, regarding that dj is a function of D−j and
then solving for ∂dj(yj)/∂D−j yields
0 =
(
1 + 2
∂dj
∂D−j
)
R′(D) +
(
1 +
∂dj
∂D−j
)
dj R
′′(D)
∂di
∂D−j
= − R
′(D) + dj R′′(D)
2R′(D) + dj R′′(D)
.
Numerator and denominator are positive, hence the derivative ∂dj(yj)/∂D−j is neg-
ative. 
Claim Assume that the bail-out probability of bank j is not too large (βj ≈ 0).
Then if the competitors deposit volume D−j rises, the curve defining the optimal
level of risk yj of bank j given the risk choice yj goes up (∂yj(dj)/∂D−j > 0).
Proof of the claim: The equation that implicitly determines the optimal yj given
dj and D−j is
∂Πj
∂yj
= 0 =
(
p(yj) + yj p
′(yj)
) (
p(yj) + βj (1− p(yj))
)2 − βj p′(yj)R(dj + D−j).
(35)
Taking the derivative with regard to D−j, regarding that yj is a function of D−j and
then solving for ∂yj(dj)/∂D−j and using p′(yj) ≈ −p(yj)/yj yields
∂yj(dj)
∂D−j
=
βj p
′(yj)R′(D)
[p(yj) + βj (1− p(yj))]2 [2 p′(yj) + yj p′′(yj)]− βj p′′(yj)R′(D)
βj≈0≈ βj
−
p′(yj)
+
R′(D)
p(yj)2 [2 p′(yj) + yj p′′(yj)]
.
The whole fraction is positive whenever 2 p′(yj)+ yj p′′(yj) is negative. Now p′(yj)+
yj p
′′(yj) < 0 for the second order condition (global assumption), and p′(yj) < 0 per
assumption. Therefore, the derivative ∂yj(dj)/∂D−j is positive. 
Finally, we now have to look at the equations (34) and (35) defining yj and dj
simultaneously. Generally, if we have two equations F (y, d,  = 0) and F˜ (y, d, ) = 0
that implicitly define a dependence y() and d(), then the implicit function theorem
implies that
∂y
∂
=
Fd F˜ − F F˜d
Fy F˜d − Fd F˜y
and
∂d
∂
=
Fy F˜ − F F˜y
Fd F˜y − Fy F˜d
.
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Applied to equations (34) and (35), we get the following. For clearness, we have
already assumed that p′′(y) ≈ 0 and R′′(d) ≈ 0.
∂yj
∂D−j
=
βj R
′(D)
(1−βj)
(
[11βj + 8(1−βj)p(yj)]p(yj) + [3βj + 4(1−βj) p(yj)]yjp′(yj)
)
+ 3β2j
∂dj
∂D−j
= − (1−βj)
(
[5βj + 4(1−βj)p(yj)]p(yj) + [βj + 2(1−βj)p(yj)]yjp′(yj)
)
+ β2j
(1−βj)
(
[11βj + 8(1−βj)p(yj)]p(yj) + [3βj + 4(1−βj)p(yj)]yjp′(yj)
)
+ 3β2j
.
Considering that p(y) + y p′(y) ≈ 0, we get
∂yj
∂D−j
=
βj R
′(D)
4 (1− βj) [2βj + (1− βj) p(yj)] p(yj) + 3β2j
and
∂dj
∂D−j
= − 2 (1− βj) [2βj + (1− βj) p(yj)] p(yj) + β
2
j
4 (1− βj [2βj + (1− βj) p(yj)] p(yj) + 3β2j
.
Because assumedly β ≈ 0, we finally get
∂yj
∂D−j
= βj
R(D)
4 p(yj)2
> 0 and
∂dj
∂D−j
= −2 p(yj)
2
4 p(yj)2
= −1
2
< 0. (36)
This was to be shown. 
Proof of proposition 4: The proof draws heavily on proposition 3 and lemma 6.
Because of (36), competitors react on an expansion of d1 with contracting their dj
by half the expansion of d1. A new equilibrium emerges with increased d1, decreased
dj for all j and increased D. Hence from the view of bank 1, the interest rate on the
deposit market is described by a function R˜(d1) instead of R(D). R˜(d1) still has a
positive slope. As a result, the statements about bank 1 from proposition 4 follow
directly from proposition 3 by replacing R(d) with R˜(d) in the monopoly case.
From the view of the competitor banks, an increase of β1 is equivalent to a rise of
volume of one of their competitor banks. Therefore, the reaction of dj and yj are
already described by lemma 6. The reaction of ρj is obvious. Because βj remains
constant, the risk level yj rises, the default premium ρj must also rise. 
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